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INDIRECT FUNDING OF SECTARIAN SCHOOLS:
A DISCUSSION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE
SCHOOL VOUCHER PROGRAMS UNDER FEDERAL
AND NEW MEXICO LAW AFTER
ZELMAN V. SIMMONS-HARRIS
B. DOUGLAS WOOD'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,' the Supreme Court of the United States examined
the question of infringement upon the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment
Establishment Clause, where a state school-funding program appropriated funds,
through vouchers issued to the parents of school children, that ultimately financed
sectarian schools.2 In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held that neutral
educational assistance programs that offer aid directly to a broad class of individual
recipients, defined without regard to religion, do not violate the Establishment
Clause even where the recipients redistribute funds to religiously affiliated institutions through their own choosing.' Though more than ninety-six percent of students
enrolled in the Ohio state program undertook studies at religious institutions, the
majority of the Court reasoned that the availability of nonsectarian schools participating in the program sustained a choice for participating parents. 4
The New Mexico Constitution is one of many state constitutions that uses more
restrictive language 5 concerning funding of sectarian educational institutions than
does the federal Constitution.6 Still, the central issue decided by the Supreme Court
remains relevant, though not dispositive, in a New Mexico examination of voucher
constitutionality: whether individual parental choice results in state funds being
indirectly contributed to sectarian or private schools.7
*
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1. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
2. Id. at 648-49.
3. Id. at 662-63.
4. Sectarian schools are those that are religiously affiliated. Nonsectarian private schools are not religiously
affiliated and generally do not include religious instruction in the doctrinal manner undertaken by sectarian schools.
5. The New Mexico Constitution states in article twelve, section three that "no... funds appropriated, levied
or collected for educational purposes, shall be used for the support of any sectarian, denominational or private
school, college or university." N.M. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
6. See Frank R. Kemerer, The ConstitutionalDimension ofSchool Vouchers, 3 TEX. F. ON C.L & C.R. 137,
161-77 (1998).
7. The present political mood in New Mexico appears to oppose school voucher programs. Past New
Mexico Governor Gary Johnson, who left office at the end of 2002, "called for his office to have more of a say in
education matters," but Governor Johnson could not persuade the Democratic-led legislature to grant him his
education plan, which included a proposal to establish private school vouchers. See Lynn Schnaiberg, New Mexico:
Building on a Base, Education Week on the Web (1999), availableat http://www.edweek.orglsreportslqc99/states/
policy/nm-up.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2003). Moreover, a study commissioned by the National Education
Association of New Mexico found more New Mexicans to be opposed to a voucher system in the state than the
National Phi Delta Kappa Gallup poll found across the country. See National Education Association of New
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This note attempts to explain the importance of Zelman on future church-state
litigation and on general education policy. First, this note will examine the factual
background, legal background, and history that resulted in Zelman being heard by
the Supreme Court. This note will then undertake an analysis of the Court's reasoning to explain how the Supreme Court used existing precedent to reach the conclusion it did. This note will also analyze the dissent and discuss precedent and
holdings favored by the four-member Court minority. Furthermore, the note will
explore the implications of this decision on subsequent church-state relations.
Finally, this note evaluates the likelihood for success of a New Mexico voucher
program, taking into account both the ruling in Zelman as well as New Mexico's
own constitutional history and provisions regarding education in light of the
relationship between church and state.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Ohio Voucher Programand the Failing Cleveland School System
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris8 originated from a school voucher program instituted
in Ohio. 9 The Pilot Project Scholarship'0 provides financial assistance to families in
any Ohio school district that is or has been "under state control."'" The program
provides tuition assistance from kindergarten through eighth grade in order for
students to attend a participating public or private school of the parent's choosing. 2
Any private school, regardless of religious affiliation, may participate so long as the
school meets state standards, is located within the boundaries of the covered district,
and agrees not to discriminate on the basis of race or religion for enrollment or
pedagogical purposes. 13 Tuition aid is distributed according to financial need. 4
Participants are eligible for ninety percent of private school tuition, but only up to
$2250."5 For lowest income families, a co-payment not to exceed $250 may be
charged. For parents who choose to keep their
children in public schools, tutorial
6
assistance is provided within the program.
Cleveland is the only Ohio school district to have qualified for the voucher assistance program thus far.' 7 More than 75,000 children are enrolled in the Cleveland
school district;' 8 "the majority of these children are from low-income and minority

Mexico, NEA-New Mexico Commissioned Poll Shows That the Public Is Concerned with Both Problems and
Solutionsfor Public Education and Does Not Favor Vouchers, available at http://www.nea-nm.org/ACTION4.HTM
(last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
8. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
9. Id.at 644.
10. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.97.4-3313.97.9 (Anderson 2002).
11. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644.
12. Id. at 645.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 646.
15.

Id.

16. Id.
17. Id.at 645. The program provides for financial assistance to families in any school district that is, by
federal court order, under supervision of the state superintendent. Cleveland was the only district to be under
supervision at the time of the program's enactment.
18. Id.
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families."' 9 Cleveland's public schools have been among the nation's worst,20 and
a federal district court declared a "crisis of magnitude" in 1995, placing the
Cleveland school district under state control.' The district "failed to meet any of the
eighteen state standards for minimal acceptable performance. 2 2 In the 1999-2000
school year, more than 3700 Cleveland students participated in the voucher program; more than ninety-six percent of these students enrolled in religiously affiliated
schools.23
In 1999, a group of Ohio taxpayers challenged the program, seeking to enjoin it
on grounds "that it violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. ,,24 Nonpublic schools and parents of students who participated or sought to
participate in the program intervened as defendants. 25 The U.S. District Court for the
District of Northern Ohio granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.26 Holding that the voucher program did not
violate the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts'
rulings.2 7

B. PriorCases Relied upon by the Majority, Dealing with SectarianSchools and
Church-StateRelations
Lemon v. Kurtzman28 is significant in any case involving state funding to sectarian
schools. In the 1971 Supreme Court decision, the Court set forth a three-part test for
determining statutory violations of the Establishment Clause.29 The Lemon test
requires that, in order for a statute to be read as not infringing on the Establishment
Clause, it must (1) have a secular legislative purpose, (2) neither advance nor inhibit
religion, and (3) not foster an "excessive government entanglement with religion. 3 °
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Zelman dealt most specifically with the second
prong of the Lemon test to determine whether voucher programs, such as the Ohio
program, had the forbidden effect of advancing religion. 3' The majority in Zelman
maintained that the second prong of the Lemon test was not violated because funding was only appropriated to a broad class of individual parents, rather than sectarian
schools directly, under the Ohio voucher program.32
While the Court looked to Lemon to examine the manner in which the Establishment Clause might be violated by the voucher program, the majority opinion,

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 647.
24. Id. at 648.
25. See Simmons-Harris v.Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 206-07 (2001), rev'd sub nom., Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
26. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648.
27. Id.at 662-63.
28. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
29. Id.at612-13.
30. Id. (Lemon dealt with the question of salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects in parochial
school.).
31. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
32. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, relied most heavily on Mueller v. Allen,33 Witters
v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,34 and Zobrest v. Catalina
3 5 to assert that
Foothills School District
"[t]hree times we have confronted
Establishment Clause challenges to neutral government programs that provide aid
directly to a broad class of individuals, who, in turn, direct the aid to religious
schools or institutions of their own choosing. Three times we have rejected such
challenges. 36 The majority relied on these three cases to establish that religion is not
advanced where legislation directly benefits the student and only, thereby, indirectly
benefits the recipient educational institution.37
Therefore, despite the fact that the Ohio voucher program puts state funds into
sectarian schools, it does so only at the guidance of individual aid recipient choice.
The intervention of individual aid recipients was enough for the majority in Zelman
to hold that Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest were controlling. Those cases collectively
held that the Establishment Clause was not violated in previous instances when
individual aid recipients directed their allotted government funding to religious
institutions.3" In each case, government neutrality as to where the funds were
directed was key in the Court's determination that religion had not been advanced.39
The first case to recognize religious neutrality in government funding to sectarian
schools was Mueller v. Allen.4 Mueller upheld a Minnesota program authorizing tax
deductions for educational expenses including private school tuition CoStS. 4 1 There,
the Supreme Court focused on the class of beneficiaries to determine that, since the
class included parents of children in sectarian and nonsectarian schools alike, the
program did not create excessive entanglement of church and state. 42 The Court
placed emphasis on the principle of private choice, noting that the religious schools
received public funds "only as a result of numerous private choices of individual
parents of school-age children ....
We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the
constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to
which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law. 43
Next, in Witters," the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a
vocational scholarship provided to a student studying to become a pastor at a
religious institution. 45 The Court looked to Mueller by holding that the vocational
scholarship "program is made available generally without regard to the sectariannonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited." 46 Thus, the

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
(1973)).

463 U.S. 388 (1983).
474 U.S. 481 (1988).
509 U.S. 1 (1993).
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649.
See id. at 639.
Id. at 649.
Id.
463 U.S. 388 (1983).
Id. at 392-97.
Id.
Id. at 399-401.
474 U.S. 481 (1986).
Id. at 489.
Id. at 487 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782-83 n.38
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Court strengthened the distinction for religious funding through independent choices
of public aid recipients.47
Finally, in Zobrest,48 the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a
federal program that permitted sign-language interpreters to assist deaf children
enrolled in religious schools. 9 Zobrest confronted the program as a whole, looking
to Mueller and Witters to support the conclusion that the program did not encroach
the boundaries of the Establishment Clause because the program "distribute[d]
benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'disabled."' 5 Thus, the majority in
Zelman insisted that the focus be on neutrality of recipients, reasoning that as long
as such neutrality,' was maintained, the actual number of program participants who
were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools was of no consequence.52
C. The Court'sApplication of Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest
The five-to-four Court majority relied on Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest to hold
that a governmental aid program that is neutral with respect to religion may provide
assistance to a broad group of citizens who in turn direct such appropriations to
religious schools through their own choosing. 3 The Cleveland program, the Court
held, made no reference to religion and expressed no religious choice; 4 the only
choice the program expressed was for lower income families to receive greater
assistance and higher priority admission into participating schools. 5
Moreover, despite the fact that forty-six of the fifty-six private schools that
participated in the program were religious schools, the Court did not hold that this
fact constituted infringement upon the Establishment Clause. 6 In Mueller,the Court
held it irrelevant to its determination that ninety-six percent of parents taking tax
deductions for tuition expenses were paying tuition at religious schools.57 In that
case, the Court determined that the class of beneficiaries included parents of
children at both religious as well as nonreligious schools. Thus, the five-member
Court majority applied the reasoning of the Mueller Court to the broad class of
parents participating in the Cleveland voucher program.5

47. Witters, 474 U.S. at 490-91 (Powell, J., concurring).
48. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
49. Id. at 4-8.
50. Id. at 10.
51. Throughout Mueller; Witters, and Zobrest, and now in Zelman, the Supreme Court has defined neutrality
as governmental neutrality, neutrality of state actors as to the type of benefits to which aid recipients pursue or how
they choose to distribute their allocated funds. The state actors may qualify the class of recipients (i.e., tax-payers,
vocational students, disabled students, economically disadvantaged students in failing Ohio schools). The state
actors may also apply broad limitations as to the nature of the distribution-in each of these cases, for educational
institutions or services. Still, while the state may generally classify recipients and the recipients' purpose for aid,
it may remain neutral as to the private/public nature of the institutions or service providers through which the
recipient may channel appropriations.
52. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 650.
53. Id. at 652, "wholly as result of their own genuine and independent private choice." Id.
54. Id. at 653.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 655.
57. Id. at 658.
58. Id.
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The Court went on to demonstrate that the same reasoning of indirect appropriation of federal funds was applied in the decisions in Witters and Zobrest.59 Individual
aid recipients in those cases were free to independently choose to pay aid money
they received to private, religious schools.' Therefore, the point of precedent had
been well established prior to the decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.6
The Court held throughout Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest that federal funding
could indirectly reach private religious institutions. However, such funding could
only be appropriated to such institutions through the choice of private individuals.
Therefore, the Court held that because aid recipients exercised independent choice
in directing the Ohio voucher program funds to sectarian schools, the Establishment
Clause was not violated.62
D. Discussionof the Majority's Chosen PrecedentCases
In Mueller, the Supreme Court stated that "[wie would be loath to adopt a rule
grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting
the extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the
law, '63 and the Supreme Court later noted in Zelman the following regarding
Mueller: "That 46 of the 56 private schools now participating in the program are
religious schools does not condemn it as a violation of the Establishment Clause."'
The majority opinion raised attention to the fact that there was "no evidence that the
State deliberately skewed incentives toward religious schools. 65
Mueller, a five-to-four decision, predisposed of the issue of choice where virtually all program participants were sectarian.' It was enough that nonsectarian
options were also implicated within the relevant legislation. 67 Therefore, the
Supreme Court had, prior to Zelman, decided that the overwhelming number of
participants who chose sectarian schools was insignificant to the Court's calculus,
so long as such choices were genuinely made by individuals, thereby relegating the
state aid to indirect status.68
In Witters, the U.S. Supreme Court only addressed the second prong of the Lemon
test. 69 In that case, a student sought financial vocational assistance from the
Washington Department of Services for the Blind.7" The Court had to determine
whether "aid.. .to support.. .religious education [was] a permissible transfer similar

59. Id. at 650-52.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 649. "Three times we have confronted Establishment Clause challenges to neutral government
programs that provide aid directly to a broad class of individuals who, in turn, direct the aid to religious schools or
institutions of their own choosing. Three times we have rejected such challenges." id.
62. Id. at 653.
63. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401.
64. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655.
65. Id. at 650.
66. Mueller, 463 U.S. 388.
67. See supra note 61.
68. Id.
69. Witters, 474 U.S. at 486. Zelman also dealt exclusively with the second tier of the Lemon test. See supra
note 31.
70. Witters, 474 U.S. at 483.
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to the hypothetical salary donation.. .or is an impermissible 'direct subsidy."' 7 1
Again the Supreme Court determined that "vocational assistance provided under the
Washington program is paid directly to the student, who transmits it to the
educational institution of his or her choice... as a result of the genuinely independent
and private choices of aid recipients. 7 2 However, the Court in Witters noted that the
program in question in that case "create[d] no financial incentive for students to
undertake sectarian education. 7 3
In Zelman, such distinctions appear unnecessary given that the substantial degree
of sectarian over nonsectarian beneficiaries in Mueller in no way affected the ruling
in that case. 74 Still, these distinctions are hardly insignificant in Witters. Indeed, the
far greater number of nonsectarian choices available in Witters may partially account
for the absence of a dissent in that case. It may also account for Justice Powell's
concurrence, which works to preserve the relationship between the ruling in Mueller
and that in Witters. Powell asserts in pertinent part that, "[c]ontrary to the court's
suggestion,... this conclusion does not depend on the fact that petitioner appears to
be the only handicapped student who has sought to use his assistance to pursue
religious training. Over 90% of the tax benefits in Mueller flowed to religious
institutions. 75 Justice Powell's concurrence suggests an analogy between the tax
deductions in Mueller and the aid provided in Witters. In doing so, he demonstrated
how the Court could follow Mueller without rejecting the Court's earlier
holding in
76
Committeefor PublicEducation and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.
In Zobrest, the Supreme Court continued the Mueller-Witters line of Establishment Clause reasoning, holding that placement of an interpreter for a deaf student
within a religious school was permissible under the First and Fourteenth Amendments "because the [Individuals with Disabilities Educational Act] creates no
financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school, an interpreter's presence
there cannot be attributed to state decisionmaking. ' 77 The five-to-four majority
decision further expressed that while previous cases 78 had struck down government
aid in the form of "auxiliary services," such cases dealt with costs for student
services that sectarian schools would have otherwise undertaken. 9
However, the Court also distinguished Zobrest from Mueller and Witters when
it stated that "this is an even easier case than Mueller and Witters in the sense that,
under the Individuals with Disabilities Educational Act, no funds traceable to the
government ever find their way into sectarian schools' coffers."8 ° Given this statement, Zobrest appears quite attenuated from Zelman as the issue of providing
funding to actual schools in Zelman becomes removed from the reasoning in Zobrest
that held as permissible a program that provided services to an individual student

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.at 487.
Id.
Id. at 488.
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401.
Witters, 474 U.S. at 491 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
413 U.S. 756 (1973); see infra Part lI.F.
Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10.
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12.
Id. at 10.
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independent of her or his chosen school of enrollment. Still, the majority in Zelman
references Zobrest as the last in its three-case line of controlling precedent. Justice
O'Connor concurred with the majority's opinion in Zelman, despite dissenting from
Zobrest, by finding that, in Zobrest, the Court had addressed a constitutional
question that was not ripe.8'
E. PriorCases, Relied upon by the Dissent, Dealing with SectarianSchools and
Church-State Relations
The Supreme Court dealt with sectarian schools and their role in church-state
relations before the rulings of Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest. In Zelman, Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer composed three separate dissenting opinions published
in that order. Justice Souter wrote the most exhaustive dissenting opinion, and his
was the opinion in which all four dissenting Justices joined. In Justice Souter's
dissenting opinion, he did not refute the majority's reading of these cases but instead
looked back to older cases, maintaining that they are still controlling.82 Certainly,
the continued division of the Court in such cases as Zobrest and Mueller demonstrated that the position of the Court was less than certain.83 Justice Souter cited
Everson v. Boardof Education of Ewing,84 decided in 1947, for the proposition that
no tax could be levied in support of religious activities or institutions.85
The dissenting Justices in Zelman maintained the need for stricter separation of
church and state concerning governmental appropriations.86 Justice Souter relied
most heavily on Everson for the proposition that no tax can be levied in support of
religious activities or institutions.87 He maintained that only through ignorance of
the holding in Everson could the Ohio voucher program be upheld as constitutional.88 Justice Souter reminded the Court that Everson is still sound, valid law and
that the majority had not fully respected the breadth and significance of the
Everson89 holding when it tied the Mueller, Witters, and Zobrestexceptions together
to formulate the rule for Zelman.
The Supreme Court's later decision in Board of Education of Central School
DistrictNo. 1 v. Allen 9° relied heavily on Everson.9' Justice White, writing for the
majority in Allen, called Everson "the case decided by this Court that is most nearly
on point for today's problem." 92 However, Justice White explained the Everson
holding in a fashion very favorable to the majority's reasoning in Zelman:
The Establishment Clause does not prevent a State from extending the benefits
of state laws to all citizens without regardfor their religiousaffiliation and does

81. Id. at 24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
82. Zelman, 36 U.S. at 686-88 (Souter, J., dissenting).
83. These cases, like Zelman, also rested on five-to-four decisions.
84.

330 U.S. 1 (1947).

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Zelman, 536 U.S. at 687 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 16).
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 684-729 (Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens, Breyer, J.J., dissenting).
Everson, 330 U.S. at 5-6 (1947).
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 688-89.
Id.
392 U.S. 236 (1968).
Id. at 241-42.
Id.
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not prohibit "New Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of
parochial school pupils as a part of the generalprogramunder which it pays the
fares of pupils attending public and other schools."93

In Allen, as in Everson, the challenged statute was upheld. Still, in Justice Black's
dissent in Allen, he explained that Everson "plainly interpret[ed] the First and
Fourteenth Amendments as protecting the taxpayers of a State from being compelled
to pay taxes... to support... private religious organizations the taxpayers oppose.""
F. PriorCases Relating to SectarianSchools and Church-StateRelations upon
Which the Respondent Relied
In the Zelman litigation, respondent's claim relied heavily on the significance of
Committee for PublicEducation andReligious Liberty v. Nyquist,95 which involved
a New York program that provided a package of benefits exclusively to private
schools and parents of children enrolled in private schools.96 The program had been
enacted for secular purposes, yet the Court held that the Act's ultimate function was
still the support of private religious schools through the program. 97 However, the
majority in Zelman rejected Respondent's argument that Nyquist applied. 98 The
majority in Zelman rejected the applicability of Nyquist to Zelman because "Nyquist
does not govern neutral educational assistance programs that, like the program here,
offer aid directly to a broad class of individual recipients defined without regard to
religion." 99
In Nyquist, the Supreme Court addressed an Establishment Clause issue confronting a statute wherein it was possible "for a sectarian elementary or secondary school
to finance its entire budget.. .from state tax-raised funds."' ° The Court held that this
section of the statute "[had] a primary effect that advances religion in that it subsidizes directly the religious activities of sectarian elementary and secondary
schools."'O' Nonetheless, dicta from Nyquist effectively supported the majority's
reasoning in Zelman: "an indirect and incidental effect beneficial to religious
institutions has never been thought a sufficient defect to warrant the invalidation of
a state law."' 10 2 The Nyquist Court referenced Justice Black's relevant statement in
Everson: "No tax in any amount.. .can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions. ' ° On the basis of that statement, Justice Powell, writing for the
majority in Everson, sustained that "[t]he controlling question here, then, is whether

93. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 17).
94. Id. at 251.
95. 413 U.S.756 (1973). Presumably, Respondent relied on Nyquist rather than Everson and Allen, on which
the dissenting Justices relied more heavily, because the overall outcome was more favorable than that in Everson
and Allen (and Nyquist was also a more recent case). Everson upheld the program that was challenged as being in
violation of the Establishment Clause but also held that no tax could be levied in support of religious activities or
institutions. Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see also Allen, 392 U.S. 236.
96. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756.
97. Id. at 779-80.
98. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662.
99. Id.
100. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. ld. at 775.
103. Id. at 780 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16).
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the fact that the grants are delivered to parents rather than schools is of such
significance as to compel a contrary result."'"' In Zelman, the Court held that this
difference was insignificant to its determination." 5
The dissent in Nyquist 0 6 relied upon the holdings in Everson and Allen and put
forth important dicta to support the Supreme Court's more recent Establishment
Clause reasoning in Mueller,"7 Witters,'0 8 Zobrest,0 9 and, now, Zelman:" ° "As in
Everson and Allen, the impact, if any, on religious education from the aid granted
is significantly diminished by the fact that the benefits go to the parents rather than
to the institutions.""' Still, in Zelman, Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished the
facts in Nyquist, maintaining that Nyquist involved benefits exclusive to private,
sectarian institutions," 2 and added, "we now hold that Nyquist does not govern
neutral educational assistance programs that... offer aid directly to a broad class of
individual recipients defined without regard to religion."".3
Il. ANALYSIS
A. Neutrality and Genuine Choice within the Ohio Program
For the Supreme Court of the United States, the primary issue to be resolved with
respect to the Cleveland Voucher Program was the second prong of the Lemon test:
whether the Ohio Program had "the forbidden 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting
religion."' '1 Perhaps the best argument against genuine choice of individual parents
is the fact that ninety-six percent of the participating students within the Cleveland
School district under the Ohio program attended sectarian schools."' The choice
between sectarian and nonsectarian schools is conceivably less than "genuine"
where so few program participants chose schools that were not religiously affiliated.
Justice Souter raises this concern in his dissent: "The question is whether the private
hand is genuinely free to send the money in either a secular direction or a religious
one .... When the choice test is transformed from where to spend the money to where
to go to school, it is cut loose from its very purpose..' ' 16
Justice Breyer added that vouchers create a distinct factual situation from
programs at issue in cases relied upon by the majority:"'

History suggests, not that such private school teaching of religion is undesirable,
but that governmentfunding of this kind of religious endeavor is far more con-

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 781.
See supra Part I.C.
413 U.S. at 805-13.
463 U.S. 388 (1983).
474 U.S. 481 (1986).
509 U.S. 1 (1993).
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 812-13.
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 661.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 648-49 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997)).
Id. at 647.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 727.
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tentious than providing funding for secular textbooks, computers, vocational
training, or even funding for adults who wish to obtain a college education at a
religious university ....
[H]istory also shows that government involvement in
religious primary education is far more divisive than state property tax exemptions for religious institutions or tax deductions for charitable contributions ....
1.8
Indeed, the difference between Zelman and the precedent on which the majority
relied is that the Ohio voucher program, unlike programs involved in Mueller,
Witters, and Zobrest, deals with the essence of education itself." 9 The right to attend
public schools and receive instruction based solely on state standards has been
transformed when students in failing schools find most of their alternatives within
institutions that can mandate religious instruction.' 2 ° Such a situation was not raised
in the majority's controlling precedent. In those cases, the programs in question
dealt with assistance to persons who had already enacted some form of choice to
fund religious schools;' 2' those programs did not create factors that would 22guide
individuals in making a choice between sectarian and nonsectarian schools.
The Ohio voucher program, on the other hand, certainly did provide incentive for
parents to choose sectarian education by making sectarian schools more affordable
than before. And again, forty-six of fifty-six participating schools were religious
institutions.' 23 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Witters noted that "aid recipients
have full opportunity to expend vocational rehabilitation aid on wholly secular
education, and as a practical matter have rather greater prospects to do so.' 24 Again,
this scenario creates a factual distinction from the broad class of aid recipients in
Zelman. Aid recipients did not have greater prospects for secular education when
employing vouchers granted under the Ohio program. Yet, such distinctions are not
recognized in the majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions in Zelman.' 25 But,
Justice Souter's and Justice Breyer's dissenting opinions do recognize the freedoms
that voucher participants must dispossess. 26 With forty-six of fifty-six schools
participating in the program being religiously affiliated, parents and students

118. Id.

119. See supra Part H.B. Mueller dealt with tax deductions for educational expenses and tuition costs. Witters
dealt with a vocational scholarship provided by the state to blind students, and Zobrest dealt with providing an
interpreter to a deaf student within a private school. Zelman deals with a class of students (unlike Witters or Zobrest)
and provides the means for this class of students to undertake schooling in private, sectarian schools (unlike
Mueller).

120. Eighty-two percent of participating schools were religious schools, forty-six out of fifty-six. Zelman,
536 U.S. at 647.
121. In Mueller, students were already enrolled in private schools prior to receiving a tax deduction. The
students involved in Witters and Zobrest first chose their school and then sought their benefit. Conversely, students
in Zelman were provided with the incentive first.
122. See supra Part H.B.
123. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655.
124.

Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.

125. 536 U.S. 639.
126. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 699, 727. Another point of policy worthy of consideration is the loss of public space
where students find themselves removed from public to private classrooms. Public educational objectives can slowly
be replaced with educational objectives established by the small private interest groups that set the objectives at
particular private schools. Such risks are undertaken whenever private objectives are commingled with public
primary and secondary education. See NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO 105 (2002). "In many ways, schools and universities
remain our culture's most tangible embodiment of public space and collective responsibility.... [T]hese quasi-sacred
spaces remind us that unbranded space is still possible." Id. at 105.
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participating in the Ohio program are largely left to choose between a failing school
and a school that requires that they sacrifice their freedom of religion.
Of further concern is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and
whether shifting educational responsibility to private schools in failing school
districts, such as the one in Cleveland, will provide services for students with special
needs. Private schools are normally not subject to the IDEA; only state public
agencies normally receive funds under the IDEA and so the Act's provisions bind
only state public agencies.' 27 However, state public agencies are still responsible for
seeing that students referred to or placed in private schools continue to receive the
rights and protections of the IDEA. 128 Nonetheless, private schools may be discouraged from participating in voucher programs if they feel that they cannot accommodate Individualized Education Plans for students with disabilities. Therefore,
vouchers may not be able to sufficiently provide alternatives to students with
disabilities in failing schools.
Still, generally, a choice is available to parents who receive vouchers, even if
more sectarian options than nonsectarian choices are available to parents.' 29 Justice
Rehnquist asserted, "That 46 of 56 private schools now participating in the program
are religious schools does not condemn it as a violation of the Establishment
Clause.' 130 Moreover, he maintained, "our focus again was on neutrality and the
principle of private choice, not on the number of program beneficiaries attending
religious schools."' 31 Justice O'Connor added that while more sectarian schools
participated in the program, greater expenditures were, in fact, appropriated to community schools and that the inquiry should consider all the alternatives to religious
school education made available to parents through the Ohio program. 32 Indeed,
under the Ohio program, "the State spent over $1 million more... on students in
community schools[, more] than on students in religious private schools because
per-pupil aid to community schools is more than double the per-pupil aid to private
schools.' 33 Justice O'Connor's observation fosters the majority's position as to the
genuine nature of parental choice under the program as does her problematic
analogy between vouchers and Medicare/Medicaid: "taking into account both
Medicare and Medicaid, religious hospitals received nearly $45 billion from the
federal fisc in 1998....Against this background, the support that the Cleveland
voucher program provides religious34institutions is neither substantial nor atypical
of existing government programs." 1
By implying a direct link between the dollar amount expended and the support
a religious institution receives from the government, Justice O'Connor detracts from
the consideration of whether parents have a genuine choice concerning religious
indoctrination of their children as students in sectarian schools. After all, treatment
at a religiously affiliated hospital would not normally include mandatory attendance
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)(2) (2002).
34 C.F.R. § 300.2(c).
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655.
Id.
Id.at 652.
Id. at 663-64.
Id.at 664.
Id. at 667-68.
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at religious services or classes on a particular religion's education. But, attending a
religiously affiliated primary or secondary school could very possibly include
mandatory attendance at such classes or services.
As Justice Souter contends, "the majority makes no pretense that substantial
amounts of tax money are not systematically underwriting religious practice and
indoctrination."' 35 He moreover observes, "Evidence shows, however, that almost
two out of three families using vouchers to send their children to religious schools
'
Justice Souter proceeds to
did not embrace the religion of those schools."136
conclude that taxpayer support of such programs necessarily underwrites political
religious teachings not supported nor condoned by the particular taxpayer: "Not all
taxpaying Protestant citizens, for example, will be content to underwrite the teaching
of the Roman Catholic Church condemning the death penalty. Nor will all of
America's Muslims acquiesce in paying for the endorsement of religious Zionism
taught in many religious Jewish schools."' 3 7
However, Justice Breyer also asks that the inquiry "[c]onsider the voucher program here at issue. That program insists that the religious school accept students of
all religions. Does that criterion treat fairly groups whose religion forbids them to
do so? '38 However, participation in the program by individual schools is a decision
made by the school. 139 Thus, the Court was reasonable in excluding this particular
consideration from its reasoning. 4 '
Still, the significance of student enrollment in schools affiliated with religions
other than that of the participating student remains significant to the question of
genuine choice. Parents are provided with a choice of where to direct their voucher
funding, but they are also provided with incentive to participate in schools outside
the failing school system. Where religious schools comprise the majority of participating schools, parents are provided with incentive to send their children to religious
schools,'' even when those schools do not represent the student's or parent's
particular religious position. Moreover, in circumstances where private religious
schools charge tuition rates significantly lower than rates charged by nonreligious
schools, nonreligious schools may not be capable of program participation because
the voucher funding and co-payment might not cover necessary student costs. Thus,
where school participation is limited, neutrality and genuine parental choice are
minimized.
Finally, the majority does not address the fact that, of the cases held as
controlling, none dealt with a statute or program that established objectives for
channeling money to religious institutions. 42 Mueller addressed taxes exempted
rather than taxes levied; 43 Witters and Zobrest addressed individuals who received

135.

Id. at 711.

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

704 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. at 147a (No. 00-1777)).
716.
724.
645.

140. See supra Part H.A.
141. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655.

142. Id. at 639-84.
143. See id. at 699; see supra note 121.
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aid from programs seeking to assist the disabled.'" The statutes in question in those
cases never expressed intent to see religious institutions as possible recipients of
indirect government funding.
Still, the indirect nature of beneficiary distribution is the nexus through which the
majority holds Zobrest and Witters to have been controlling, despite the program
directly eliciting participation from sectarian schools.'45 For the majority, the
program's solicitation of participation by nonsectarian schools, coupled with the
parents' ability to choose where the money is to be spent, was enough to make the
program more comparable to those in Zobrest and Witters than that of Everson.'4 6
However, both the Everson-Allen-Nyquist and the Mueller-Witters-Zobrestlines of
reasoning remain viable. Therefore, the Court necessarily chose the controlling law
in Zelman. The Everson holding has not been overruled. Accordingly, future courts
may construe the principal of private choice as to church-state relations more
narrowly. Thus, Everson remains as significant as Zelman in determining future
cases concerning the Establishment Clause and government aid to schools.
B. FederalImplications:Equal Access to EducationalChoice
In Justice Thomas's concurrence in Zelman, he proposes a forward-looking
position. Instead of focusing largely on recent cases dealing with the Establishment
Clause, Justice Thomas asks us to remember that the only reason that the First
Amendment is an issue for a state education program is the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 47
' He more directly challenges the program's opponents
on Fourteenth Amendment grounds: "Opponents of the program raise formalistic
concerns about the Establishment Clause but ignore the core purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' ' 48 Justice Thomas asserts that voucher programs, such as
the one in Ohio, will help economically disadvantaged families to better access the
means of equal protection through better access to education. 149 He adds, "Minority
and low-income parents express the greatest support for parental
choice and are
150
most interested in placing their children in private schools."'
Certainly, such a statement must be taken under consideration by policy opponents of vouchers who believe that society disserves lower-income citizens by pulling
at the threads of public education. 151 Perhaps Justice Thomas's concurrence also
provides planning advice for future courts and especially future legislators
addressing voucher programs. The Ohio program statute contains a clause addressing co-payments:

144. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 699; see supra note 119.
145. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644-47.
146. In Everson, the Court held that the levy of such taxes directly advanced religion in defiance of the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 676-84.
147. Id. at 683-84.
148. Id. at 682.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 682 n.7.
151. Opponents may generally make the argument that funds taken away from the public school system will
equate to attention taken away from the public school system resulting in closure of schools and fewer public school
options for students.
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For these lowest income families, participating private schools may not charge
a parental co-payment greater than $250 ....
For all other families, the program
pays 75% of tuition costs, up to $1,875, with no co-payment cap....These
families receive tuition aid only if the number of available scholarships exceeds
the number of low-income children who choose to participate.'
Therefore, should courts later examine the question of vouchers through an equal
protection challenge, the maximum income of participants with capped co-payments
might be a consideration.
Still, Justice Thomas's opinion begs the question as to the program's ability to
serve all persons in need of assistance: "While the romanticized ideal of universal
public education resonates with the cognoscenti who oppose vouchers, poor urban
families just want the best education for their children, who will certainly need it to
function in our high-tech and advanced society."'5
Many middle-class students as well as children whose parents minimally exceed
the income necessary to qualify will also need the best education to function in
society. Justice Thomas's opinion implies a shortsighted solution in responding to
schools that do not offer the necessary quality of education to any of their students
by providing a means of escape to only the most economically deprived students.
Still, his approval of the Ohio program, which does prioritize services to impoverished students, does not preclude his approval to similar measures available to
middle-class students. Justice Thomas's reference to the cognoscenti indicates that
his disapproval extends to parents who can easily afford to send their children to
private schools and who choose to do so despite their formalistic aversion to such
options being available to less wealthy students in the name of the wall separating
church and state.
Both majority and dissent criticize each other for formalistic reasoning. Justice
Thomas accuses voucher opponents of ignoring the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment when they formalistically apply the Establishment Clause as an absolute
limitation against state interaction with religious school education. 5' Likewise,
Justice Souter believes the principle of no aid to religious institutions to be so fundamental to constitutional protections that he criticizes the majority's distinguishing
line of reasoning: "for Mueller started down the road from realism to formalism."' 55
Nonetheless, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas held that "any effect on those
students remaining in the public school system is purely speculative."' 56 This statement serves to dismiss any challenge by parents not within the program's requisite
income level. However, if the effect of staying in schools that are presently failing
is only speculative, then the removal of students from such schools cannot provide
any proven benefit. Thus, the fundamental objective of vouchers comes into
question.

152. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 646.
153. Id. at 682.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 693.
156. Gatton v. Goff, Nos. 96CVH-0 I-193, 96CVH-01-721, 1996 WL 466499 at * 19 (Ohio Ct. of Common
Pleas, Franklin County, July 31, 1996), affd Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (2001), rev'd Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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C. New Mexico Implications
Because parents direct the aid to their choice of either sectarian or nonsectarian
schools, state funding becomes a step attenuated from the sectarian institutions that
thereby receive indirectaid from the state. However, the New Mexico Constitution
expresses that "no part of.. .funds appropriated, levied or collected for educational
purposes shall be used for the support of any sectarian, denominational or private
school.... ,,'Because the New Mexico Constitution prohibits state educational funds
for sectarian or private schools, the choice between sectarian and nonsectarian
schools provided to Cleveland voucher program participants may not be relevant in
a New Mexico constitutional examination. 5 8 Where private religious and nonreligious schools fall within a single category, it becomes more difficult for a court
to hold that parents are provided with a legitimate choice.'5 9 Moreover, it becomes
additionally difficult for a court to hold that appropriation of state funds to private
schools is an indirect benefit to such institutions through the actions of a parent
the parent may direct state funds is an area that is constituwhen the only area where
60
tionally prohibited.
Should the same circumstances surrounding the Ohio program surround a
voucher program in New Mexico, the New Mexico Supreme Court will face a more
difficult challenge in upholding the program as "no... funds... for educational
purposes, shall be used for the support of any sectarian, denominational or private
school, college or university."'' 61 A voucher program like that in Ohio would likely
be found to have a valid legislative purpose, but, in the absence of participating
public schools, it could still be held to directly aid private schools, religious and
nonreligious, both of which facially appear forbidden to receive state aid under the
New Mexico Constitution.162 Frank R. Kemerer observes, "While direct support
seems ruled out, the [New Mexico Clonstitution does not address educational
appropriations that may indirectly benefit denominational or private educational
institutions. A 1976 attorney general opinion recognized this fact in noting that a
voucher system would aid children, not schools.' ' 163 Thus, a New Mexico voucher
program could still be held as constitutional if the New Mexico Supreme Court
maintains that all aid received by private schools comes from schoolchildren's
parents rather than the state. However, like the Supreme Court of the United States,
New Mexico may see more than one line of reasoning available to it in making its
decision. 64 Thus, the decision could largely rest upon from the popular political
attitude toward the challenged voucher program legislation.

157. N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3.

158. Id.
159. See infra discussion of the passive voice in N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3.
160. See infra discussion of N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3.
161.

N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3.

162. Article twelve of the New Mexico Constitution deals generally with New Mexico education, including
funding, attendance, educational rights, and other matters related to New Mexico schools and New Mexico
schoolchildren. Id.
163. Kemerer, supra note 6, at 173.
164. See supraPart II.A.
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Attempting to determine the outcome of such an issue creates much ambiguity
and uncertainty. The Supreme Court of the United States did not make so much an
informed decision as an active choice in deciding Zelman. After all, the EversonNyquist line of reasoning remained valid as certainly as did the Mueller-WittersZobrest line of cases that the Court chose as controlling the interpretation of the
Ohio statute.'65 Specific cases have not arisen in New Mexico to provide guidelines
as to the possible outcomes of a challenge to a similar educational program and
statute under the New Mexico Constitution. Thus, the New Mexico Supreme Court
would confront a case of first impression with only the New Mexico Constitution
itself to rely on in its reasoning. So again, in the absence of guiding state precedent,
the New Mexico Supreme Court may look to political policy rather than legal
interpretation.
Initially, one might think that the lack of guiding precedent would simplify the
issue for the state supreme court. However, the New Mexico Constitution itself
provides a source of ambiguity in that article twelve, section three is written in the
passive voice. Consider: "no.. .funds.. .for educational purposes, shall be used for
the support
of any sectarian, denominational or private school, college or university.,'166The court may face a determination of what limitations exist as to the
subject of the appropriations' use. The provision does not state that the legislature
may not use such funds for sectarian or other private schools. 167 If it did state as
much, perhaps the New Mexico courts could reason, as did the Supreme Court of
the United States, that so long as such funds were not paid directly by the state
legislature to the sectarian school, but rather as the by-product of recipient choice,
the use of public funds in sectarian and religious schools would not be prohibited.
However, as the framers of the New Mexico Constitution did not designate a
subject limitation upon the provision, perhaps greater limitations exist. Indeed, the
lack of a specific subject may certainly be construed as an intentional preemption
against loopholes such as state funding reaching public schools through a third party
unspecified in the text of article twelve of the New Mexico Constitution. Thus,
advocates of a New Mexico state school voucher program will likely have a far
greater hurdle to overcome when confronted with the language of the New Mexico
Constitution than did the defendants in Zelman in overcoming the Establishment
Clause of the federal Constitution. Specifically, the New Mexico Constitution does
not limit who may use appropriations but does limit where and for what those
appropriations may be used. 168 New Mexico constitutional limits are placed on the
source of the appropriations: any funds levied for educational purposes are prohibited from use in sectarian, religious, or private schools. 169 Such funds may not be
placed in coffers of any private school, religious or otherwise, regardless of the
source that would place them there.170 Consequently, the indirect nature by which
the state funds land in private school coffers may not preclude a successful

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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challenge under the New Mexico Constitution as it did with the Ohio statutory
program under the U.S. Constitution.
Still, voucher proponents might well stress that the limitation of article twelve,
section three is a direction to the state, i.e., that the absence of the subject does not
create an additional state restriction and that, furthermore, constitutional restrictions
are always restrictions on state actors in the absence of direct provision or case law
interpretation to the contrary. Such an argument may provide proponents a means
for using Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest as guiding precedent for a New Mexico
voucher issue.
However, article nine, section fourteen of the New Mexico Constitution speaks
expressly to the ways in which funds may be directly or indirectly appropriated by
the state: "Neither the state nor any county, school district or municipality, except
as otherwise provided in this constitution, shall directly or indirectly lend or pledge
its credit or make any donation to or in aid of any person, association or public or
private corporation .... ....
The language of this clause suggests here that the direct
or indirect nature of the donation will not affect a voucher program's constitutionality in a determination of the state involvement in a program that benefits individual
rather than state interests. 172

Nonetheless, the body of the clause as a whole does not present an absolute
limitation, but rather a list of social programs where the state finds its commercial
interaction to provide a legitimate state interest. In other words, the list does not
demonstrate that the state intends to limit its involvement with private persons or
enterprises, but rather provides an enumerable, amendable means through which
constitutional inclusion precedes statutory action rather than precludes it. The
present provisions of permissible funding include student loans and funding for
Vietnam Veterans, demonstrating the provision's adaptability to changing times and
changing social policy. 7 3 Subsection D of the provision also instructs as to
implementing legislation for newly created programs excepted under an amendment
to the clause. 7 4 Thus, article nine, section fourteen demonstrates itself to be a very
adaptable area of the constitution. Thus, a constitutional amendment to article nine,
section fourteen could provide an exception to the state's constitutional inability to
donate funds to private persons or enterprises.
Still, for a voucher program to be added to the article nine, section fourteen list
and thus become constitutionally permissible, such an amendment would still be
required to logically coexist with article twelve, section three. Thus, the dual impact
of article nine, section fourteen's limitation on indirect means coupled with article
twelve, section three's restriction on state funding of any type to private schools
might very well require two constitutional amendments in order to satisfy exceptions
in each area of the New Mexico Constitution.
Moreover, in Opinion of Patricia A. Madrid, issued on January 29, 1999,175 the
Attorney General examined the language of article twelve, section three and found

171.

N.M. CONST.art.
IX,§ 14.

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id.
1999 N.M. Op. Att'y Gen. no. 1 (Jan. 29, 1999).
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the language to be straightforward: "it provides, without any qualification, that funds
appropriated for educational purposes shall not be used for the support of religious
or private schools."' 76 The Attorney General appeals to the plain meaning rule of
statutory and constitutional interpretation: "Under statutory construction principles,
which also apply to the interpretation of constitutional provisions, see Postal
Finance Co. v. Sisneros, 84 NM 724, 725, 507 P.2d 785 (1973), the intent of a
provision's 177drafters is to be determined primarily by the language of the
provision."
Still, the Attorney General's opinion also relied on the reasoning presented to the
Supreme Court of the United States in Zelman to conclude that such a program
would be unconstitutional. 7 7 The Attorney General's opinion honors the position
of the dissent rather than the majority. 179 Therefore, it remains possible that the New
Mexico Supreme Court could follow the reasoning of Zelman by choosing to
distinguish Nyquist from New Mexico legislation in the same way that the Supreme
Court of the United States distinguished Nyquist from Zelman.
Still, the state's prohibition on any state funds to sectarian or private nonsectarian
schools 8 ° creates a stronger obstruction to such state based funding than that of the
U.S. Constitution's First Amendment Establishment Clause. Indeed, the Zelman
majority relied on Witters, yet Witters itself provides an example of an act confronting greater constitutional restriction under its state constitution than under the
federal Constitution:
Legal authorities from other states have concluded that governmental tuition
assistance benefiting sectarian institutions violates those state's [sic] constitutional provisions protecting religious freedom. See, e.g., Witters v. State Comm 'n
for the Blind, (holding, after remand by the United States Supreme Court, which
found no Establishment Clause violation, that state financial aid to a visually
handicapped student to enable him to attend a private bible college violated the
Washington Constitution's prohibition against using public money for religious
instruction).'
The Attorney General's opinion also adds as to article 9, section 14:
As interpreted by New Mexico courts, the antidonation clause appears to prohibit the state from providing tuition assistance in the form of vouchers to
private school students. Whether the beneficiary of the assistance is the parents
or the schools, the use of public money to subsidize the education of private
school students, without more, is a donation to private persons or entities in

176. Id. at2.
177. Id.
178. Id.at 3.
179. Compare id. (asserting that the Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged that the effect of tuition
assistance paid to parents is to provide financial support for the schools their children attend) with Zelman, 536 U.S.
at 684-729 (holding that, where a government program is neutral with respect to religion, the indirect effect of
financially supporting sectarian schools does not violate the Establishment Clause).
180. N.M. CONST. art. XIL § 3.
181. 1999 N.M. Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 175, at 6. Remember also that Witters is the one case in the U.S.
Supreme Court majority line on state aid to religious institutions (Mueller, Witters, Zobrest, and now Zelman) that
was not a five-to-four decision. The Supreme Court of the United States decided by unanimous decision that there
was no infringement of the federal Establishment Clause in the Witters case, 474 U.S. 481.
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violation of the state constitution. The educational purpose of private schools,
an undeniably public purpose, is not sufficient to immunize the voucher program
from constitutional challenge.'82
Again, absent an amendment to the antidonation clause permitting voucher-type
funding, the Attorney General's argument as to the unconstitutionality of a voucher
program is beyond dispute.8 3 However, the New Mexico Constitution could easily
be amended so as to include a provision for voucher programs. Still, while such a
change is possible, albeit depending on the popular political mood toward vouchers,
the spirit of the antidonation clause would still appear to be violated; the clause
speaks directly and expressly to public schools and their inability to fund private
sources.' 8 Since vouchers would be an allocation of funding that would normally
go to a public school, appropriations from public to private schools would effectively be validated if the antidonation clause were amended to permit voucher funding.
The Attorney General's opinion also incorporates article two, section eleven;
article four, section thirty-one; and article twelve, section one to support its thesis
that a New Mexico school voucher program would be held as unconstitutional.'85
Article two, section eleven states that "no person shall be required to attend any
place of worship or support any religious sect or denomination; nor shall any
186
preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship.'
Essentially, this provision incorporates the federal Establishment Clause into the
New Mexico Constitution.'87 The Attorney General opinion recognizes that the
provision has been applied by the same standards as the Supreme Court of the
United States has used in dealing with the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 88 If that holds true in the present circumstances, New Mexico would
follow the federal Supreme Court's lead by finding a voucher program similar to the
one in Ohio not to be in violation of the New Mexico Establishment Clause. However, as the opinion also points out, the New Mexico appellate courts have
demonstrated a willingness to provide greater protections than might be provided
under federal Supreme Court analysis.' 89
The Attorney General recognized that relevant case law does provide a means of
overcoming a state constitutional challenge under article four, section thirty-one. 9 °
Under that provision, no appropriations are to be made to any entity "not under the
absolute control of the state."' 9' However, in State ex rel. InterstateStream Commis-

182. 1999 N.M. Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 175, at 5.
183. N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 14 (This constitutional provision prohibits the state from contributing funds to
any private entity, directly or indirectly. Thus, the indirect nature of funding to private schools under the Ohio
Program does not function to avoid a constitutional violation under Article IX, § 14 of the New Mexico
Constitution.).
184. N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 14.
185. 1999 N.M. Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 175, at 5-8.
186. Id.
187. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. .
188. 1999 N.M. Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 175, at 5.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 6-7.
191. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 31.
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sion v. Reynolds, 9 ' the New Mexico Supreme Court held, "The fact that non-profit
organizations may incidentally benefit from the appropriations made to the State
Engineer, who has absolute control over their expenditure," removed the issue from
challenge under article four, section thirty-one.'93 As the Attorney General Opinion
noted, a similar challenge to school voucher programs is not foreclosed.' 94 Indeed,
the appropriations may very well be found to have greater than "incidental" value.
Still, federal Supreme Court reasoning under Zelman could serve as guidance for the
New Mexico Supreme Court to find that no such challenge exists because the funds
may be said to be appropriated to the state department of education. Then, being
completely within that agency's control, such funds may be distributed to a broad
class of individual recipients, as were the funds in Zelman.' 95
Finally, article twelve, section one states, "A uniform system of free public
schools sufficient for the education of, and open to, all the children of school age in
the state shall be established and maintained.' 96 Facially, no challenge is proffered
to a school voucher program within this provision, but as the Attorney General's
opinion notes, "if the program diverted state funds from the public schools to the
extent that it compromised the state's ability to meet its obligation to establish and
maintain a public school system sufficient to educate all school age children in the
state,"'9 7 the program responsible for creating the damage to the public school
system would have to come under scrutiny. 98 Therefore, a demonstration that a
voucher program bolstered the success of sectarian or nonsectarian private schools,
at the expense of the continuation of free public schools, could create a future
constitutional claim supported by New Mexico Constitution, article twelve, section
one.
Moreover, article twelve, section one provides a present source for policy guidance for legislative decisions on voucher programs. When considering legislative
purpose, one might reconsider Justice Thomas's concurrence and his suggestion that
voucher programs can serve the important purpose of providing improved education
for economically disadvantaged students residing in failing school districts. 99
However, many disadvantaged school districts have been the product of lack of
community financial support: essentially, lack of a strong property tax base.2"
Alternatively, New Mexico maintains a Public School operational funding
formula through which funding is more evenly distributed to school districts.2"'
Where steps have already been implemented to encourage equality in spending in
public schools, less initiative remains for supporting constitutionally questionable
statutory programs that seek to withdraw funding from public schools in order to
192. 71 N.M. 389, 378 P.2d 622 (1963).
193. 71 N.M. at 396, 378 P.2d at 626.
194. 1999 N.M. Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 175, at 7.
195. 536 U.S. at 640.
196. N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
197. 1999 N.M. Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 175, at 8.
198. Id.
199. For a discussion of Justice Thomas's concurrence, see supra Part lH.B.
200. Commonly, property taxes provide the basis for school district funding, resulting in vast disparities in
the amount of funding various school districts are allocated. See generally JONOTHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE
INEQUALrIES: CHILDREN tN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991).

201. See NMSA 1978, § 22-8-25, et seq. (2002).
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redistribute it to private schools. Indeed, where equitable allocation is statutorily
enacted to preserve equity in student spending, additional pressure would likely
mount against a program that would conceivably allow certain students to remove
themselves to private schools through state funding while not providing this same
option to other students. Still, proponents might adapt Justice Thomas's argument
to posit that real equality could only be achieved when economically disadvantaged
students are provided with equal access to all their educational options. Proponents
might moreover argue that vouchers provide a means of providing such equal access
to successful schools to all students.
Indeed, assurance of a continuing public school system for all citizen students
was at the core of the original educational principles guiding article twelve of the
New Mexico Constitution.20 2 Robert W. Larson records the sentiment of the framers
regarding the essential nature of the New Mexico constitutional educational
provisions:
Constitutional safeguards of the rights of Hispanoswere made nearly impossible
to amend. Voting and educational rights in particular were specifically mentioned in the constitution .... Section 10 of Article XH declared that "children of
Spanish descent" would never be denied the right of admission to the public
schools, nor ever "classed in separate schools, but shall forever enjoy perfect
equality with other children in all public schools."...The stringent provisions
regarding equality for the Spanish-speaking citizen were intended to overcome
the fears and apprehensions of the native population that they might be
discriminated against by the Anglo majority .... Native delegates were especially
20 3
adamant against any provision for separate schools, even for Negroes.
The intent here appears to be the continued guaranteed existence of a unified school
system. Certainly, there appears no suggestion of curbing the growth of public
schools; instead, a strong desire to be inclusive rather than duplicitous seems
clear. 2' Thus, the framers have implicitly discouraged state sponsorship of any
school system that would deviate in any way from a fully integrated state system.20 5
Thus, any state sponsorship, however indirect, for a school supporting a specific
creed or religion appears suspect.
Still, advocates of a voucher system can certainly support an argument like that
of Justice Thomas, which holds that equality is better achieved through the voucher
program, which provides a means for economically disadvantaged students to enter
schools that had not theretofore been available to them. 2 6 Essentially, they may
argue that all students having access to all schools, public and private, was
fundamental in the shaping of article twelve of the New Mexico Constitution. Thus,

202. See generally ROBERT W. LARSON, NEW MExico'S QUEST FOR STATEHOOD, 1846-1912, ch. 16 (1968).
203. Id. at 279; see also N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 1 ("No amendment shall restrict the rights created

by.. .Sections Eight and Ten of Article XII.. unless it be proposed by vote of three-fourths of the members.. .and
be ratified by a vote of the people of this state.. .three fourths of the electors voting on the amendment vote in favor
of that amendment."). Thus, a super majority is necessary to amend the New Mexico Constitution where the
educational rights of children of Spanish dissent are concerned; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 10 ("Children of Spanish
descent... shall never be classed in separate schools, but shall forever enjoy perfect equality.....
204. LARSON, supra note 202, at 279.
205. Id.
206. For a discussion of Justice Thomas's concurrence, see Part fI.B.
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by improving full public access to all institutions of learning, the voucher program
better assists New Mexicans in achieving a school system available to all, thereby,
maintaining a free and open system, even if through what some might perceive as
separate schools.
However, Larson provides one more important detail in settling the issue of
whether New Mexico could adopt the Establishment Clause interpretation provided
by Zelman: "From the time the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed, there were
Some Anglos and
New Mexicans who.. .preferred territorial status to statehood ....
Hispanos feared that statehood would result in a domination of one group by the
20 7
Thus, in Larson's
other, with ensuing complications in Church-state relations.,
record, it appears essential that stringent limitations on the state interaction with
religion were of fundamental importance to its varied citizenry from the political
inception of the state of New Mexico. 2 8 Retention of public institutions that could
find no way of sponsoring the cultural and religious customs of any particular group
2°
was a paramount concern of the constitutional composers.
The pendulum of these arguments swings rapidly back and forth. Ultimately,
much of the New Mexican argument will fall to what the legislatures and courts will
classify as the best reasonable means for achieving students' equal access to free
public education. Much will depend also on what New Mexico courts are willing to
classify as "indirect" funding of religious institutions, if New Mexico courts are
willing to adopt an "indirect" line of reasoning at all. Is educational equality best
achieved by helping eliminate economic limitations on access to private schools?
Does such a program make the whole system freer and more public or does such a
program burden existing public schools, thereby diminishing the education of those
left behind within such schools? Are those students remaining in the public school
system left to wonder where to turn for their free and equal public schools while
classmates use state funds to access an outside source? It seems that, for New
Mexico, vouchers would entail an overhaul of past constitutional reasoning as well
as existing constitutional provisions. A voucher program would create difficulties
such as a necessary amendment to the antidonation clause, a suspect classification
of "indirect funding" under article twelve, section three, and a possible state-church
entanglement issue-a situation the framers thought it particularly important to
avoid.2"'
With these burdens, it seems unlikely that New Mexico legislators and policy
makers will undertake such an initiative in the hopes of improving education in New
Mexico. Rather, it appears that New Mexico values find state involvement in
sectarian, and otherwise private education, contrary to the state's educational
purpose.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Two valid lines of Court precedent were available as guidelines to determine the
outcome of Zelman. The Supreme Court of the United States chose to adopt the line
that provides greater options to parents but also the line that results in greater
church-state interaction. A voucher program may well be attainable by New
Mexicans, but the additional burdens that must be overcome make such an
alternative line of reasoning more difficult to accept under more stringent New
Mexico constitutional law.

